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Abstract:  
This paper looks at the imperfections in the knowledge economy in Arab 
countries. It uses series of data including the Hofstede index to show how these 
imperfections are translated into the measures of knowledge and development. The 
outputs from Arab countries are also compared to those from the Eastern European 
Economies. The outcomes do clearly indicate the existence of a gap between Arab and 
Eastern European Economies and underline that more efforts need to be devoted to the 
reduction of imperfections in Arab economies.  
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Introduction 
In relation to the different indicators of knowledge economy, some Arab countries 
appear to be exhibiting higher values while others are still having modest performances. 
Furthermore, different reports have been discussing series of initiatives devoted to the 
promotion of different dimensions of knowledge economy in variety of Arab countries. 
But, almost all of these countries have been recently exhibiting economic performances 
that are not consistent with the expansion of knowledge components. They all show high 
levels of unemployment including for skilled labor and they all show limited creation of 
new enterprises.  
This paper is devoted to showing that there are imperfections in these economies that 
prevent the attainment of the performances expected. These imperfections are also related 
to the way the knowledge economy is introduced, monitored and governed. 
Different authors have been looking at these imperfections. Some authors emphasize the 
social and economical imperfections already existing in these economies. Others focus on 
the existence of rents and other economic distortions that prevent from looking at 
alternative and innovative means to push further the frontiers of these economies. Others 
insist on the role of culture and societal organization in pursuing initiatives related to the 
development of the knowledge economy.  
This variety of approaches is first reviewed before introducing series of quantitative 
means to show the extent of imperfections of the knowledge economy in Arab countries 
and the likely directions of social and cultural changes that are required.  
The present paper is composed of two main sections. The first one looks at the variety of 
approaches related to the extent and magnitude of imperfections. The second section 
focuses on empirical investigations that relate to series of social measures including those 
suggested by Hofstede with their relationships to knowledge and human development 
indices.  
 
I. Literature Review 
Farzanegan (2012) attributes the limited creation of enterprises in Arab countries 
to the negative economic effects of the excessive rents from natural resources. To the 
author, resource-rich countries of the Middle East and North Africa have the highest 
youth unemployment rate in the world while other parts of the world are experiencing an 
increasing trend in the creation of new enterprises as a potential solution to 
unemployment. But, the Arab region has the lowest records in new business 
establishments. Growth theory highlights the importance of entrepreneurship. In the 
Solow model (1956) growth comes from new and larger plants (economies of scale), 
while in the Romer model (1990), it comes from new and growing firms (knowledge 
spillovers). The above author uses series of publications such as that of Acs, 
Braunerhjelm, Audretsch and Carlsson (2009) who show how knowledge spillovers 
following research and development spending create opportunities for entrepreneurs. 
Other authors cited include those that focus on new firms as an indicator of 
entrepreneurship and of higher economic growth and productivity (Hause and Du Rietz, 
1984; Black and Strahan, 2002; Djankov, La Porta, de Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; 
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). The development of new enterprises lead also to 
higher employment (Birch, 1979) and Birch (1987), more technological innovations (Acs 
& Audretsch, 1990), and higher levels of education (Dias & McDermott, 2006).  
According to ILO (2011), the youth unemployment rate for males and females in this 
region was 22 and 39 percent respectively, while the average world figure was 13 
percent. These unemployed could be a source of economic growth in the case of more 
business friendly policies for the private sector. The following table compares the rate of 
firms’ entry density in the Arab region with other regions. It shows that Arab countries 
have the lowest rate of entry of new firms in the world (table 1). 
Table 1: Comparing businesses between Arab and other economies 
 
 
According to the above author, the literature on the resource curse shows that natural 
resource curse may reduce economic growth and thus investments and employment as in 
Frankel (2010) besides Van der Ploeg (2011).  Some authors relate the curse to the Dutch 
disease where high oil prices increase the effective exchange rate leading to appreciation 
of the domestic currency. This increases the price of non-oil exports (Corden and Neary, 
1982; Corden, 1984; van Wijenbergen, 1984; Torvik, 2001). Others relate the problem to 
the neglect of human capital. When countries invest less in education leading to lower 
economic growth in the long run, natural resources become a curse (Gylfason, 2001).  
Other authors relate that to the nature and quality of institutions (Robinson, Torvik & 
Verdier, 2006).  Others focus on the rent seeking behavior and the attractiveness of the 
natural resource sectors (Torvik, 2002). 
The examination by Farzanegan (2012) of resource rents in relation with 
entrepreneurship activities shows that point source resources (such as oil and coal) have a 
statistically negative effect on entrepreneurship.  
Achy (2012) relates unemployment and job vulnerability to the economics of the 
rents that are prevailing in the Arab economies. The author considers that the few jobs 
created are precarious and related to low productivity sectors. To adjust their 
unemployment rates with the world average, 20 million jobs are needed while keeping 
the current rate constant requires 13 million jobs. This necessitates a constant economic 
growth of at least 5 percent while the 20 million jobs required for adjusting 
unemployment rates need an annual growth rate of 8 percent. This cannot be achieved 
under the on-going development model. This model is mainly based on the economics of 
rents, subsidies, fiscal favors and lack of transparency. It needs to be changed to a new 
model to be merit based and without excessive rents.  
Schwalje (2012) argues that Arab countries are pursuing knowledge-based 
economic development founded on flawed practices as initiated by international firms 
and domestic organizations including governments. To this author, the adoption of the 
knowledge economy concept by the Arab region has been motivated by the enhancement 
of the welfare of individuals. These characteristics could be valued in the labor market to 
match high wage employment opportunities expected to be generated by emerging high 
skill, knowledge-based industries. However, the high wage, high skills jobs associated 
with knowledge-based industries have not materialized in the region and are increasingly 
subject to competition from the emergence of low wage, high skill workers in other 
developing countries. The failure of Arab economies to deliver on the livelihood 
generating promises of knowledge-based development has caused economic 
impediments. 
This same author and in another paper (Schwalje, 2011) shows the low match 
between the skills of public sector employees and the work roles they perform 
particularly at lower administrative levels. The author cites Al-Yahya (2004) who 
introduces the evidence that formal educational qualifications are frequently not related 
to current jobs and a high number of public sector employees who believe their current 
jobs require low levels of their perceived skills and capabilities. Citing deficiencies in 
soft skills like communication, teamwork, analytical skills, and innovative thinking, a 
recent survey of the private sector also found that 46% of regional CEOs do not believe 
that education and training systems in the Arab World prepare students for the workplace. 
In addition, the author insists on the impacts of knowledge economy on skills formation 
and claims that vocational training could have a negative reputation regionally. This may 
force students to study abroad which perpetuates the brain drain of talented students. 
At the higher education level, low levels of professorial titles and lack of tenure 
systems fail to incentivize professors to engage in academia full time (Choueiri, 2008). 
Additionally, the use of Arabic, English, and French in education and training systems 
has consequences at several levels including cultural identity; research productivity and 
locally produced knowledge; and in terms of facilitating ambitious scholars to seek 
higher qualifications outside the region. 
The Arab world suffers also from a weak innovation system in which R&D 
spending is significantly lower than in the developed world with very little private sector 
funding (UNESCO, 2010). Regulatory frameworks do not protect intellectual property 
leading to low level of patents and stifling private R&D expenditure. There is a weak 
government policy making in research and innovation 
Furthermore, the research function has gradually been marginalized in Arab 
universities. University research centers are few and do not have access to critical 
resources (UNESCO, 2003). 
In many countries in the Arab world, firms have anecdotally expressed a concern 
faced by employees with skill deficiencies that limit performance. This has been often 
labeled as a “skills gap.” Giving the regional human capital challenges described thus far, 
it would be reasonable to hypothesize that skills gaps are likely widespread in many 
countries in the Arab region in the private sector. 
The data from the Arab CEO survey suggests that Arab countries, particularly 
Gulf countries, are amongst the top of the ranking in terms of facing the highest 
prevalence of skills gaps globally. 
Also the Arab human capital investments meant to support knowledge-based 
development over the last decade have been marginally successful. The burden of making 
up for inadequate pre-employment skills formation shifts attention from the formal 
education system as provider of knowledge and skills towards the role of firm training in 
eliminating skills gaps.  
In addition, the number of employers providing formal training to permanent 
employees is comparatively low: Algeria (29%), Egypt (12%), Jordan (24%), Lebanon 
(68%), Mauritania (24%), Morocco (20%), Oman (20%), Syria (21%), and Palestine 
(27%) 
In this perspective, Arab countries are pressured to reinforce their education and 
training systems in order to create lifelong learning and employment opportunities. A 
number of Arab countries have already launched strategies and action plans in this regard 
especially when facing several education and training persistent challenges.  
Qatar has launched in 2011 a new education and training strategy aiming at the 
following objectives: quality, equity, inclusiveness, portability, and mobility. The country 
has even developed new frameworks and processes to effectively manage the new 
resources allocated to the education and training sectors along with the improvement of 
the reforms’ implementation, policy making, as well as monitoring progress to go in line 
with the country’s development strategies (Schwalje, 2012).  
Besides the above explanations, the nature of the central power in relation to 
market forces has also been described as imposing constraints on economic and social 
reforms in Arab countries. In a paper by Dabrowski (2012) and for the period 1950s to 
1970s, the author claims that the so-called Arab socialism has some analogies to the 
model of previous communist countries. The author considers that some Arab countries 
had imitated the Soviet experience of central planning, especially with respect to 
investment processes driven by political considerations and import-substitution 
industrialization strategies. The evidence is given by oil-producing countries, such as 
Algeria, Libya and Iraq which had the capacity to pursue such policies. Some other 
countries that had regional conflicts, allocated a large share of their public expenditure to 
military and security programs. But, the author considers that by the early 1980s (Egypt) 
and 1990s (Algeria and Tunisia), there has been a start to switch from administrative 
dirigisme in the economic sphere, usually with the active engagement of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  This process is driven by external factors 
like the fall of oil prices in the mid-1980s, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, economic 
reforms in China, India, and other developing countries and domestic policy needs 
(combating macroeconomic instability and the desire to avoid political unrest).  In 2000s, 
Libya and Syria for example that are the most closed countries, started to pursue more 
flexible economic policies with limited market reforms.  
As the Arab and Soviet-type economies are not similar, the experience of the 
post-communist transition of 1990s may not be also identical for Arab countries. Even 
though there are some similarities in some economic problems, the solutions cannot be 
found following the same paths. But, sources of market failures but also of government 
failures as they have been related to the existence of commons and anti-commons are 
causes that could constrain development and impose high transactions as in Aoki (1998), 
in Bergstrom (2010), in Buchanan and Yoon (2000), in Canavese (2004) but also in 
Coelho, Filipe and Ferreira (2009). Other authors such as  Cantrell, Hettel, Barry and 
Hamilton (2004), Depoorter and Vanneste (2004),  Hardin (1968),  Heller (1998),  Kelly 
and Michelman (1980), Nash (2001) besides Ostrom (1990), Ostrom and Schlager 
(1992),  Parisi, Depoorter and Schulz (2003) and Parisi, Depoorter and Schulz (2005); 
with Velho (2004) address the imperfections related to different forms of ownership of 
natural resources.  
Imperfect markets or social imperfections are important directions that show how 
Arab countries try to reduce or eliminate direct and indirect subsidies from domestic food 
and energy products to reduce excessive budget deficits (which threaten the 
macroeconomic stability). These market distortions are directly related to trade and 
domestic production. The food and energy subsidies under these economic, social and 
political conditions become consequently hard to change in face of the on-going interests 
expressed by different social groups. Transition to new regimes of supporting food and 
energy appears to be hard to implement because of major imperfections in the economies.   
This is also the case for external economic relations. The economies of Arab 
countries must undoubtedly become more open among themselves and with the wider 
world. But there was a lot of progress made in this sphere in the last 15 years. Most of the 
Arab countries are now members of the WTO. They concluded free trade agreements 
among themselves, with the European Union, and some of them also are with the United 
States.  
There are also some differences in the privatization policies since there is less to 
privatize in Arab countries compared to the post-communist countries in the early 1990s. 
The first reason is that nationalization in Arab countries never went as far as it did in the 
Soviet bloc countries.  Secondly, a large part of public ownership included the oil and gas 
industries’ assets, which will not be part of privatization for political reasons. Thirdly, 
there are a lot of Arab countries that already started privatizing several years ago. 
Furthermore, they must now avoid the revolutionary temptation to reconsider some of the 
past privatization deals considered unfair by the wild public. Finally, there will be some 
differences in privatization methods. Arab countries have working capital markets and 
enjoy access to international financial markets. Hence, they can privatize for money, to 
strategic investors or through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
Besides the above authors, others have been mainly looking at the likely effects of 
cultural variables on economic changes and on the adoption of the components of the 
knowledge economy. The contributions of Hofstede (1980, 2001 and 2010) have been 
substantial in characterizing a variety of behaviors throughout series of countries. The 
likely relationships between the indices provided by the latter author are used to 
empirically test for the links between these indices and those of the knowledge economy. 
A case study about the Management Information System (MIS) component of knowledge 
is also introduced to show that there are imperfections in the adoption of the knowledge 
economy in Arab countries.  
 
II. Empirical Analysis: Hofstede Indices and Knowledge 
Economy 
This empirical part of the study looks at the positioning of Arab countries in 
relation to Hofstede dimensions and attempts to investigate the links between these 
dimensions and knowledge and human development variables.  
1. A descriptive Analysis 
According to Hofstede (1980, 2002 and 2010), the values that distinguished countries 
from each other could be grouped statistically into five clusters that are: Power Distance 
(PDI), Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV), Masculinity versus Femininity (MAS), 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) and Long Term Orientation (LTO). These cultural 
variables are respectively introduced based on the definitions given by the above author.  
Power Distance (PDI): This measures the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not 
from above. It suggests that a society’s level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as 
much as by the leaders. 
Individualism (IDV): Individualism is the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, that 
is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we 
find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to 
look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find 
societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue 
protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
Masculinity (MAS): Masculinity versus femininity refers to the distribution of roles 
between the genders which is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range 
of solutions are found. Related studies have revealed that (a) women’s values differ less 
among societies than men’s values; (b) men’s values from one country to another contain 
a dimension from very assertive and competitive and maximally different from women’s 
values on the one side, to modest and caring and similar to women’s values on the other. 
The assertive pole has been called ‘masculine’ and the modest, caring pole ‘feminine’. 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAV): Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society’s tolerance 
for uncertainty and ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members 
to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured 
situations are novel, unknown, surprising, and different from usual. Uncertainty avoiding 
cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety 
and security measures.  
Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is the fifth dimension considered by Hofstede (2010) 
which was added after the original four ones to try to capture any difference in thinking 
between the East and West.  
The values that are shown for Arab countries and are introduced in the following table 7 
based on those appearing on Hofstede (2010) website. The values are relatively high for 
PDI, lower for IDV and higher for MAS and UAI. These say that in comparison with 
other countries, the recognition of inequality, the dominance of males and the avoidance 
of risk are major features in most of Arab countries.  
Table 2: Values attained by Arab countries in Geert Hofstede dimensions 
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
UAE 90 25 50 80  
Kuwait 90 25 40 80  
Egypt 70 25 45 80  
Iraq 95 30 70 85 30 
Lebanon 75 40 65 50  
Morocco 70 25 53 68  
Saudi Arabia 95 25 60 80  
Arab world 80 38 52 68  
The following section attempts to show how the above variables are related to the 
knowledge economy as represented by KEI and to the human development index (HDI). 
2. Regression Analysis 
This is devoted to testing for any link between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, 
knowledge (KEI) and Human Development (HDI) indices. As shown in the following 
table 3, only IDV and UAI appear to be related to KEI.  
 Table 3: Regressions of KEI on four Hofstede’s indices (all countries) 
 PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI -0.184 
(-1.734) 
 
0.628 
(5.958) 
 
-0.085 
(-1.034) 
 
0.191 
(2.341) 
 
.546 
HDI -0.151 
(-1.245) 
 
0.540 
(4.477) 
 
-0.029 
(-0.309) 
 
0.239 
(2.562) 
 
.405 
 
These same variables appear also to be driving HDI. But when taking all the countries, 
PDI appears to have a negative effect on KEI only. This leads to testing if higher PDI 
countries are similar or different from low PDI, knowing that Arab countries are in the 
first category. This is confirmed by the Chow test that is computed after having the 
required regressions. This says that PDI has a negative effect for low PDI countries and a 
positive effect for high PDI economies. The outcomes are introduced in the following 
tables 4 to 8.  
Table 4: Regression Results: High and Low PDI countries combined  
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI 4.115 
(3.517) 
 
-0.020 
(-1.734) 
 
-0.063 
(5.958) 
 
-0.011 
(-1.034) 
 
0.019 
(2.341) 
 
.546 
HDI 0.597 
(7.261) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.245) 
 
0.003 
(4.477) 
 
0.000 
(-0.309) 
 
0.001 
(2.562) 
 
.405 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Results: High PDI countries 
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI -1.568 
(-0.658) 
 
0.033 
(1.276) 
 
0.069 
(3.248) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.094) 
 
0.029 
(1.961) 
 
.362 
HDI 0.201 
(1.154) 
 
0.003 
(1.356) 
 
0.003 
(2.116) 
 
0.001 
(0.424) 
 
0.002 
(2.163) 
 
.288 
 
Table 6: Regression Results: Low PDI countries 
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI 5.150 
(4.449) 
 
-.048 
(-2.970) 
 
.056 
(5.601) 
 
-.016 
(-1.702) 
 
.034 
(3.363) 
 
.639 
HDI .680 
(8.395) 
 
-.003 
(-2.776) 
 
.003 
(4.206) 
 
-.001 
(-1.020) 
 
.002 
(3.380) 
 
.530 
 
Table 7: Chow test to compare high PDI and Low PDI countries 
KEI SSR k N S1+S2 
Sc-
(S1+S2) 
N1+N2-
2k Den Num F 
Comb. 189.539 5 77 142.535 47.004 65 2.1928 
9.400
8 
4.28
7 
(**) 
high PDI 
countries  95.543 5 37             
Low PDI 
countries 46.992 5 38             
 
 
Countries with low and high PDI (power distance) are different from each other as shown 
trough the above tables and mainly with the level of the Chow test (table 13).  
 
Table 8: Combining tables and Chow Test 
HDI SSR k N S1+S2 
Sc-
(S1+S2) 
N1+N2-
2k Den Num F 
Comb. 0.935 5 77 0.74 0.195 65 0.0114 0.039 
3.42
6 
(**) 
high PDI 
countries  0.51 5 37             
Low PDI 
countries 0.23 5 38             
Fstat (5,65) =2.36 for 0.05 
Fstat (5,65) = betw. 3.34 and 3.29 for 0.01 
As we need to compare Arab countries to Eastern European economies and even with 
limited number of observations, a Chow test is computed for these groups of countries. 
The regression results for both KEI and HDI show positive and statistically significant 
effects for PDI and IDV with negative effects for MAS and UAI at the level of the 
combined sample.  
Table 9: Regression Results (Arab and Eastern European countries combined) 
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI -2.856 
(-.967) 
 
.102 
(2.968) 
 
.164 
(4.644) 
 
-.084 
(-2.914) 
 
-.002 
(-.094) 
 
.680 
HDI .262 
(1.676) 
 
.007 
(3.811) 
 
.009 
(4.776) 
 
-.005 
(-3.451) 
 
-.001 
(-.668) 
 
.676 
But, at the level of Arab countries only the effect of PDI is observed. No affect appears 
for the group of Eastern European countries.  
Table 10: Arab countries 
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI -9.507 
(-1.365) 
 
.089 
(2.247) 
 
.097 
(1.310) 
 
.014 
(.203) 
 
.054 
(1.077) 
 
.807 
HDI -.170 
(-.358) 
 
.008 
(2.927) 
 
.009 
(1.738) 
 
-.001 
(-.324) 
 
.001 
(.352) 
 
.835 
  
Table 11: Eastern European  countries 
 Cst PDI IDV MAS UAI R² 
KEI 4.067 
(.928) 
 
.072 
(1.497) 
 
.106 
(1.967) 
 
-.068 
(-1.846) 
 
-.040 
(-1.544) 
 
.628 
HDI .580 
(1.986) 
 
.004 
(1.328) 
 
.006 
(1.538) 
 
-.004 
(-1.477) 
 
-.002 
(-.993) 
 
.429 
The Chow test shows that the two groups of countries show statistically similar patterns 
with regard to Hofstede variables in relation to HDI and KEI. Consequently, there are 
similarities with regard to the links between human development and knowledge 
economy variables and the cultural dimensions as suggested by Hofstede (tables 12 and 
13).  
 Table 12: Chow test to compare Arab and Eastern European  countries for KEI 
KEI SSR k N S1+S2 
Sc-
(S1+S2) 
N1+N2-
2k Den Num F 
Comb. 11.087 5 15 4.997 6.09 5 0.9994 1.218 1.219 
Arab economies 1.626 5 6             
Eastern European 3.371 5 9             
 
Table 13:  Chow test to compare Arab and Eastern European   countries for HDI 
HDI SSR k N S1+S2 
Sc-
(S1+S2) 
N1+N2-
2k Den Num F 
Comb. 0.031 5 15 0.023 0.008 5 0.0046 0.0016 0.348 
Arab economies 0.008 5 6             
Eastern European 0.015 5 9             
Fstat (5,5) = 5.05 for 0.05 
Other authors more engaged in behavioral economics, appear to be providing further 
microeconomic frameworks for experimenting with attitudes towards different 
parameters including those related to knowledge economy. These contributions appear 
also to be promising for Arab countries. Further research is consequently needed in the 
area of behavioral economics for these countries.  
 
Conclusion 
The descriptions and analyzes pursued in this article show that even with the existence of 
highly performing enterprises in Arab economies, the creation of new enterprises suffers 
from series of constraints as shown in different publications and reports including those 
that are dealing with doing business. This means that the youngest generations and the 
skilled labor issued from the education system do not benefit from new business 
opportunities in most Arab countries. Does this trend explain the high unemployment 
rates that prevail in North African, Jordan and Yemen?. Furthermore, the results attained 
in the present paper show the prevalence of economic and social imperfections with 
regard to the adoption of knowledge economy and thus limit access to new development 
opportunities. Different explanations are provided and converge to indicate that the 
political economy of the Arab countries needs to shift towards a more knowledge 
economy approach with further economic and trade openness. The Eastern economies 
have appeared to be creating more incentives for new enterprise creation with a better 
business environment where knowledge is seen as engine for growth and development.  
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